Share this Article & Support our Mission Alpha for Impact
This is some text inside of a div block.
This is some text inside of a div block.
This is some text inside of a div block.

Trader Dilemma: Trade immediately or wait and see?

Post by 
Text Link
Particularly when the markets are exaggerated, it can be observed that many market participants act hastily. In panic phases, they pull out for fear of further price losses, while in phases of euphoria they fear that they will miss further price gains and therefore buy up. Ultimately, transactions are therefore carried out without having informed themselves well beforehand. If a sufficient number of market participants act in this way, prices can become increasingly inefficient if the trend dynamics continue. Chad Kendall's paper "Market Panics, Frenzies, and Informational Effciency" examines the reasons for this using an experimental model.

The "game" with information

Extreme market movements are often described as irrational and paraphrased with terms like panic or euphoria. In fact, however, it may well be rational motives that lead to such developments. If market participants have certain information, it is not only a matter of using it to their expected advantage - it must also be taken into account that other players may have anticipated them and the information may already have been priced in. It can therefore make sense to act early on, even if the information is still imprecise or uncertain.

A laboratory experiment

Laboratory experiments are important because in the real market it is difficult to observe or measure crucial parameters such as the timing and quality of private information. The model is based on the assumption that a certain amount of time is needed to collect or process good information about the value of an asset. All information that is priced in by other market participants in the meantime reduces the potential profit. Accordingly, there is a trade-off between acting quickly (Rush) and waiting for better information (Wait).

In his study, Chad Kendall therefore conducts the experiment with these two model variants:

Rush: The information is correct with a moderately high probability (75 percent) Rush is rational and, according to the theory, can be expected.
Wait: The information is correct with a hardly better probability than pure chance (54 percent). Here it is rational to wait until better information is available.

The laboratory experiment runs as follows:

A run is carried out over eight periods, whereby each of the eight participants only has to make exactly one trade
The start value is 0.5 and the end value after eight periods either 0 or 1
Additional private or public information is added over the periods until the result is certain in the eighth period
In order to examine learning effects and to shed light on the behavior of experienced market participants, a total of 30 runs are completed
The experiment will be conducted four times each for Rush and Wait (64 participants in total)

Participants must decide simultaneously in each period whether to trade or wait. Everyone must trade exactly once within the eight periods. In doing so, the participants can see the price development and the trades of the others (+1 for buy, -1 for sell). The price is calculated by the computer and continuously reflects both the publicly available information and the private information revealed by previous trades.

trader dilemma
Figure 1) Exemplary view in period 4
Source: Kendall, C. (2020), Market Panics, Frenzies, and Informational Efficiency: Theory and Experiment, p. 86
Many discretionary market participants tend to act prematurely - even when it would be clearly better to wait due to a poor information situation. In this context, systematic strategies that make it possible to profit from such effects on the basis of clear decision rules are interesting. The advantage here is that there is no additional level of interpretation with potentially distorting behavioural effects. Decisions are always made objectively, so that both positive and negative results are visible without distortion.
Chad Kendall, „Market Panics, Frenzies, and Informational Effciency“

Traders cannot wait

In the rush experiment, the results turn out as rationally expected: after only a few repetitions, most participants tend to act already in the first period instead of waiting for a further improvement of the already moderately good information situation.

In contrast, the results of the Wait experiment are surprising. Theoretically it was to be expected that due to the bad information quality a decision is made as late as possible, ideally only in the last period.

In fact, however, many participants act much earlier - even after several runs and correspondingly rather negative feedback of their hasty decisions.

The author attributes this to the fact that the participants follow a momentum-like strategy: Instead of making rational decisions about future developments based solely on the information available, they also react to the past course history. They only wait until they feel sufficiently confident to anticipate the most likely outcome and then act in that direction. In the course of the experiment, a certain level of necessary "certainty" is established on the basis of the accumulated historical information, at which point they are ready to make a decision. This behavior is surprisingly robust to learning effects and persists even after clearly negative experiences.

As is to be expected according to theory, the participants in the Rush experiment (left graph) act early and learn to trade mainly in the first period during the course of the experiment based on the predominantly positive results due to the already moderately good starting information. In the Wait experiment, on the other hand, they do not hold back until the end, as is to be expected in theory, but trade much earlier despite rather negative results due to the almost random start information.

trader dilemma_02
Figure 2) Rush vs. Wait in the first and last five runs
Source: Kendall, C. (2020), Market Panics, Frenzies, and Informational Efficiency: Theory and Experiment, p. 89

The premature action in the Wait experiment can also be justified by the fact that the participants are aware of their strategic interaction with each other. On the one hand, the available information is rather poor, but on the other hand, the costs of further waiting are overestimated - after all, the others might beat you to it. As a result, rather hasty decisions are made.

Conclusion

Many discretionary market participants tend to act prematurely - even if it would be much better to wait and see due to a poor information situation.

The study shows by means of a laboratory experiment that this is related to simple heuristics - in particular the procyclical behavior due to observed price trends (momentum trading). This can contribute to exaggerations both upwards and downwards and to prices becoming increasingly inefficient as long as a sustained trend dynamic exists.

Of interest in this context are systematic strategies that allow investors to benefit from such effects by means of clear decision rules. The advantage is that there is no additional level of interpretation with potentially distorting behavioral effects. Decisions are always made objectively, so that both positive and negative results are visible without distortion.

Source: Kendall, C. (2020), Market Panics, Frenzies, and Informational Efficiency: Theory and Experiment, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2020, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 76-115

Would you like to use this article - in full or in part - for your purposes? Then please consider the following Creative Commons-Lizenz.